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T he significant threat of cyberat-tacks on critical infrastructure can motivate metric development. 
Physical destruction is not the only 
threat to critical infrastructure sys-
tems1 — if a system such as an electric 
grid suffers a cyberattack and cannot 
accurately control power distribution 
using computer networks, such as the 
Internet, the effect could be as disas-
trous as a direct terrorist attack on 
power plants or transmission lines.2 
In the US, almost every economic and 
social function is based in some way on 
energy distribution, telecommunication 
services, and transportation services. A 
successful cyberattack on these infra-
structures would have devastating 
effects on the economy and public life.3 
In addition, President Barack Obama 
says that the US must begin building 
a “smart grid,” which would make the 
country less vulnerable to blackouts 
or even attacks, in addition to saving 
money and aiding renewable energy.
The costs of worms, viruses, and 
other malicious software (malware) 
attacks have been significant. The num-
ber of such attacks reported has gone 
from near zero in the mid 1990s (four 
attacks reported in 1995) to roughly 
200,000 in 2003. Cost estimates for 
cyberattacks, including hacking, mal-
ware, and spam, have gone from US$1 
billion in 1996 to $56 billion in 2004.1 
The estimated costs include business 
interruption, denial of service (DoS), 
data theft or deletion, loss of sensitive 
To achieve their full potential, networks must be secure as well as functional. 
With this in mind, the author identifies metrics designed to mitigate 
vulnerabilities to cyberattacks in networks that are key to the critical 
infrastructure of the US. He discusses both growth metrics — based on 
data obtained from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
and Department of Homeland Security vulnerability database — and metrics 
designed to mitigate the risk of security vulnerabilities in networks. If used 
together, these two types of metrics can help make networks more secure.
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intelligence or intellectual property, loss of repu-
tation, and share-price declines.4 Unfortunately, 
the threat is not confined to organizations such 
as public utilities. Rather, it’s pervasive, involv-
ing, for example, financial, investment, and 
information distribution institutions; even pop-
ular social networking organizations are vul-
nerable to attack. Thus efforts to mitigate the 
threat of vulnerabilities should be universal.
Multivector threat weapons attempt to 
exploit a diverse array of security vulnerabili-
ties to gain access to a system. Buffer over-
flows, HTTP input validation vulnerabilities, 
and known default passwords are just a few 
common entry points for these hybrid threats. 
We are continually discovering vulnerabilities 
in all kinds of email, Web, chat, file transfer, 
and other services and functions. It is well 
known that many of these vulnerabilities are not 
patched immediately (or at all) because system 
administrators are increasingly overwhelmed 
by the sheer volume of vulnerability reports 
and advisories. Attackers can incorporate any 
combination of these ubiquitous vulnerabilities 
— or even as yet undisclosed flaws — into a dan-
gerous tool. Once the malicious code has gained 
access to a system, it can propagate and execute 
its payload. So, we can assume that the inci-
dence of attacks is proportional to the presence 
of vulnerabilities5 and thus mitigate the conse-
quences of an attack on facilities such as the 
electric grid by forecasting such vulnerabilities 
and their rate of change.
The existing federal incident reporting sys-
tem contains qualitative attack information 
but does not support quantitative vulnerability 
assessment. Thus, the security community must 
focus on developing vulnerability forecasting 
equations from publicly available sources that 
organizations can use to predict vulnerability 
to cyberattacks based on various factors. I have 
designed several metrics that could help avert 
the risks of vulnerabilities. 
Cyber Incident Reporting System
One reason for developing metrics systems is 
that although the following incident catego-
ries and reporting system are useful, they are 
qualitative; require too much information to be 
reported, which can lead to disuse; and have 
no statistical or forecasting capability. The last 
point is crucial because although we cannot do 
anything about the past, we can proactively 
mitigate the effects of cyberattacks that are 
likely to occur in the future by quantitatively 
forecasting vulnerabilities.
The US federal government’s cyberattack 
reporting system is issued by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
As NIST Special Publication 800-61 defines, 
a computer security incident within the fed-
eral government is a violation or imminent 
threat of violation of computer security poli-
cies, acceptable use policies, or standard com-
puter security practices (see http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistpubs/800-61/sp800-61.pdf ). 
Reports of computer security incidents should 
include a description of the incident or event, 
using the appropriate taxonomy and as much of 
the following information as possible (however, 
reporting shouldn’t be delayed to gain addi-
tional information): 
• agency name;
• point-of-contact information, including 
name, telephone number, and email address;
• incident category type (that is, CAT 1 or CAT 
2; see Table 1); 
• incident date and time, including time zone;
• source IP, port, and protocol;
• destination IP, port, and protocol;
• operating system, including the version, 
patches; 
• system function (for example, DNS/Web 
server or workstation);
• antivirus software installed, including ver-
sion and latest updates;
• location of the systems involved in the inci-
dent (Washington, DC, or Los Angeles, for 
example); 
• method used to identify the incident, audit 
log analysis, system administrator);
• impact to agency; and 
• resolution.
Technical Approach 
The approach I propose is to develop risk-based 
metrics that can identify system vulnerabili-
ties and detect anomalous system behavior6 to 
mitigate Internet cyberattack effects.7 The goal 
is to reduce the risk of cyberattack on the US’s 
critical infrastructure. We can link these met-
rics to the operations of critical infrastructure 
control functions, such as multilayered electric 
grid systems (for instance, substation networks 
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Pittsburgh. Downloaded on January 6, 2010 at 16:43 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Network Security
66   www.computer.org/internet/ IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING
linked via the Internet). Although I use the 
electric grid as an example for explaining the 
technical approach, the metrics and the metrics 
development process are applicable to all criti-
cal infrastructure systems. It would be conve-
nient to have a single metric, say, on a scale of 1 
to 100, to capture the cyberattack threat. How-
ever, cybersecurity is a multivariable problem, 
and attempting to mix the variables in a single 
metric would obscure each variable’s contribu-
tion to a system’s vulnerability.
Vulnerability Forecasting Metrics
To provide a framework for analyzing metrics, 
we can divide the metrics into the following 
categories: severity, type of vulnerability (for 
example, buffer-overflow error), vulnerabil-
ity by type of system access (network, adja-
cent network, and local), and vendor source of 
vulnerability. I base this categorization on the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).8 
The data I used in computing the metrics is 
from the publicly available NIST/DHS National 
Vulnerability Database (http://nvd.nist.gov), 
which comprises data collected from real-
world networks. Because these are time-series 
data, and the objective is to develop forecast-
ing metrics, I plot the data and use regression 
analysis to construct forecasting equations. 
If you wish to analyze cybersecurity for your 
particular network, you would start by deter-
mining whether there is any historical vulner-
ability data for that network. If so, you would 
plot the vulnerability count over time and use 
regression analysis to develop forecasting equa-
tions. If you lack data, use the NIST/DHS data 
to develop forecasting equations. In addition to 
being collected from actual networks, the data 
is reported by major network vendors. Thus, you 
could use data corresponding to your vendor-
supplied network and develop representative 
forecasting equations. 
The National Vulnerability Database con-
tains a CVSS 2 calculator that was used for 
Table 1. Federal agency incident categories.
Category Name Description Reporting time frame
CAT 0 Exercise: network 
defense testing
Used during state, federal, national, and international 
exercises, and approved activity testing of internal/external 
network defenses or responses. 
Not applicable; is for each 
agency’s internal use during 
exercises
CAT 1 Unauthorized access Used when an individual gains unauthorized logical or 
physical access to a federal agency network, system, 
application, data, or other resource. 
Within one hour of discovery/
detection
CAT 2 Denial of service 
(DoS)
Used when an attack successfully prevents or impairs the 
normal authorized functionality of networks, systems, or 
applications by exhausting resources (includes being the 
victim or participating in the DoS). 
Within two hours of 
discovery/detection if the 
successful attack is still 
ongoing and the agency is 
unable to successfully mitigate 
activity
CAT 3 Malicious code Used when successful installation of malicious software 
(such as a virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based 
malicious entity) infects an operating system or application. 
Agencies aren’t required to report malicious logic that has 
been successfully quarantined by antivirus software. 
Daily (within one hour 
of discovery/detection if 
widespread across agency) 





Includes any activity that seeks to access or identify a 
federal agency computer, open ports, protocols, service, 
or any combination for later exploit. This activity doesn’t 
directly result in a compromise or DoS. 
Monthly (if system is classified, 
report within one hour of 
discovery) 
CAT 6 Investigation Includes unconfirmed incidents that are potentially 
malicious or anomalous activity that the reporting entity 
deems warrants further review. 
Not applicable; is for each 
agency’s use to categorize 
a potential incident that’s 
currently being investigated
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these calculations. The calculator computes 
the vulnerability severity score based on sev-
eral subjective metrics, such as related exploit 
range, undefined local adjacent network, and 
network attack complexity. This is one way to 
assess vulnerability that practitioners might 
find useful. An advantage is that it lets you 
immediately assess vulnerability. It’s often 
tempting to assign qualitative values to sub-
jective factors and then compute an overall 
score, but a better approach is to just use the 
qualitative assessments and not compute a 
numerical score that could be devoid of mean-
ing. My proposed approach, taking the long 
view, uses the CVSS vulnerability categories to 
develop forecasting equations with the impor-
tant objective of predicting vulnerabilities’ 
future impact. 
Severity
Figures 1 and 2 show the first category, sever-
ity. Figure 1 plots the actual any (that is, all 
severities), high, medium, and low severities for 
the period from 1988 to 2007, as the NIST/DHS 
vulnerability database defines them. The rea-
son for the decrease in 2007 is that not all of 
the data for that year had been reported when 
I conducted this analysis. In addition, I fitted 
a curve to the any category plot so that I could 
develop a vulnerability predictor for 2008. A 
very good fit, represented by R2, shows that 
vulnerabilities are increasing at an exponen-
tial rate, which would be an alert to security 
personnel to mitigate those vulnerabilities’ 
consequences. Figure 2 shows both the pre-
dicted any count and its rate of change. Given 
that the predictor is an exponential function, 
the rate of change is proportional to the count. 
Because we can expect attacks proportional to 
vulnerabilities, this doesn’t bode well for the IT 
community. These forecasts serve as alerts that 
it should take action to mitigate the threat of 
cyberattacks, such as intrusion-detection moni-
tors installed at the interface of local networks 
and the Internet, as Figure 3 shows. (I could 
have used many networks to portray the cyber 
threat — I use the substation diagram in Fig-
ure 3 because it illustrates the threat to the US’s 
electric grid mentioned previously.) Thus, you 
can see that a good way to assess the criticality 
of vulnerabilities over time is to forecast their 
rate of change. An increasing trend foretells an 
increasing threat. 
Type of Vulnerability
The second category — type of vulnerability 
— also exhibits exponential growth. To illus-
trate this growth, Figure 4 shows two types 
of vulnerability: buffer overflow and software 
design errors. The first type represents the con-
sequences of DoS attacks, which in many cases 
lead to buffer overflow; this type is growing at 
a fast clip. A good countermeasure is to use a 
buffer size limit and check it on every access 
to the buffer. The second type is under the 
software engineer’s control; all code should be 
secure from internal and external corruption. 
Fitting a predictor function to these data was 

























V (t ) = 1.6707 *e(0.4437t )
 
R 2 = .9614
Series 1: actual any severity count
Series 2: actual high severity count
Series 3: actual medium severity count
Series 4: actual low severity count
Series 5: predicted any severity count
Figure 1. The vulnerability count V(t) vs. time t. We can see the 
actual any (that is, all severities), high, medium, and low severities 

























Series 1: Predicted any vulnerability count V (t )
Series 2: Rate of change of V (t )
0.4437 V (t )
Figure 2. The vulnerability count V(t) and the rate of change in 
V(t). Given that the predictor is an exponential function, the rate 
of change is proportional to the count.
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dent variable variation accounted for by inde-
pendent variable variation, was low.
Table 2 shows the major contributors to soft-
ware flaws in 2007 by type of vulnerability 
error, along with the corresponding counter-
measures. The database has so many categories 
that a given one doesn’t represent a large per-
centage of total vulnerabilities for 2007, but the 
table shows the more significant ones. Many of 
the vulnerability types in Table 2 aren’t new to 
IT. Protection against buffer overflow, design 
and code inspections, checking input data to 
see that it doesn’t corrupt the program, and 
checks to determine the validity of access were 
considered good software development prac-
tices long before the cyber threat — thus, just 
enforcing these practices would go a long way 
toward mitigating that threat.
Type of Access Category
Figure 5 dramatically shows that when we ana-
lyze the type of access, we should really worry 
about network connectivity and the conse-
quences of Internet attacks.9,10 Not only does 
this vulnerability grow exponentially, but it 
also accounts for 91 percent of access problems 
reported in 2007 (as opposed to 9 percent for 
local access). Furthermore, network vulnerabili-
ties’ rate of change will track vulnerabilities 
at a proportionality constant of 0.4893, as the 
prediction equation shows. We can have confi-
dence in the predictor V (t) because of R2’s high 
value. An example of a countermeasure is the 
packet filter that’s installed between the substa-
tion network and the Internet in Figure 3.
Vendor Source Category
Figure 6 shows the last category, vendor source 
of vulnerabilities, which is both interest-
ing and requires some caveats. As expected, 
Microsoft leads the pack, but vulnerabilities 
attributed to Hewlett-Packard (HP) are rapidly 
Ethernet
Gateway 1 Buffer
Relay Remote transfer unit Meter Sequence of
events recorder
Gateway 2 buffer Gateway 3 buffer
Substation communication network
Personal computer
Power quality Digital fault recorder
Intelligent electronic devices
L
L: link attack: severe; affects a major part of the network







































Series 1: buffer overow errors
Series 3: software design errors
Figure 4. Vulnerability count. We can see two types of vulnerability 
— buffer-overflow errors and design errors — vs. time t.
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growing. However, the counts depend on the 
frequency of reporting, which in part reflects 
the vendor market share. A case in point is 
HP’s position as the number one PC vendor. 
Despite these caveats, these plots give users a 
rough assessment of the relative cyber threat 
incurred when they use certain vendor soft-
ware and hardware.
Risk Aversion Metrics
Because the growth metrics do not tell the entire 
story of how to mitigate the cyber threat, par-
ticularly with respect to vulnerability risk, Table 
3 shows additional metrics with an accompany-
ing metrics development process in Figure 7. We 
can assume that attackers can gain access to the 
periphery of critical infrastructure systems, so 
my focus is on preventing further intrusion if 
this occurs, as the examples in Table 3 and Fig-
ure 7 show. 
This particular set of metrics was motivated 
by vulnerabilities existing in the substation 
network that Figure 3 shows. Other metrics 
would be applicable to other applications. For 
example, a hacker could compromise a user’s 
Web search and obtain information to access 
that user’s computer. So, for this application, 
we would define a vulnerability metric as “ille-
gal access to Web search” and a risk mitigation 
action as “ensuring that vendor’s search engine 
is secure.”
Although no attack data is available from the 
CVSS database, an organization that has been 
subject to attacks could record those attacks’ 
characteristics (for example, DoS) and correlate 
these data with vulnerability data, as Figure 
7 shows, to identify metric thresholds that are 
appropriate for the types of attacks (see Table 3). 
T oo many metrics are difficult to learn and manage and are expensive to implement 
due to the labor cost involved in, for example, 
monitoring for anomalous activity to mitigate 
against DoS attacks. So, I suggest using only 
those metrics that are relevant for your orga-
Table 2. Vulnerabilities by type of error for 2007.
Type Count % Countermeasure
Buffer 131 2 Buffer access limits
Authentication 15 0 Encrypt access privileges
Design 69 1 Software design inspections
Code 121 2 Software code inspections
Input 101 2 Input validity checks
Access 66 1 File and program access checks




















Series 1: actual network access
Series 2: actual local access





V (t ) = .5838* e(.4893 t )
R 2 = .9582
Figure 5. Vulnerability count by type of access V(t) vs. time t. 
Network access vulnerability accounts for 92% of access problems, 




























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Series 1: Microsoft
Series 2:  Apple
Series 3: IBM
Series 4: Hewlett-Packard
Figure 6. Vendor source of vulnerabilities V(t) vs. time t. Microsoft 
leads the pack in vulnerabilities, but those attributed to Hewlett-
Packard are growing.
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nization’s security system. In Table 3, “met-
ric threshold” corresponds to the metric value 
when risk mitigation is invoked. Not all these 
metrics would necessarily be allocable to all 
organizations. Based on past vulnerabilities, 
an organization could select metrics that are 
most applicable to its environment. For exam-
ple, if an attacker has hacked an organization 
from the outside, installing a firewall is easy 
to do and could provide the most benefit for 
the investment.
Many attacks originate from inside an orga-
nization, however, so organizations should 
adopt risk aversion metrics, such as the access 
control lists and code-scanning tools Table 3 
lists, to prevent access to critical resources by 
unauthorized personnel.
In addition to these risk-mitigation ac tions, 
cryptography and user authentication are 
 useful for preventing break-ins to critical 
 infrastructures. 
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